World War Two: Day of Infamy, 7 December 1941

FIRST AIR FLEET: During the Strike Force’s run south, because of the rough seas, it was still not known whether the planes could be launched on schedule. At 0500, reconnaissance floatplanes were catapulted from the heavy cruiser Tone and Chikuma to determine whether conditions were still favorable for the raid. (Reports were, in fact, received from them just prior to the attack, marking ship targets.) An hour later, it was decided to launch the first strike at once, because it was feared that the pitching carrier decks would make the launching operation take longer than planned. Yamamoto believed that the formal declaration of war would be delivered to the U. S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull by Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura and Special Envoy Saburo Kurusu, at 0800 Hawaiian time; he had issued strict orders that the raid should not take place until after war had been declared–preferably at least thirty minutes afterward. He could not afford a much longer wait, because then the secrecy of the air assault would be endangered. If Nagumo began to launch at 0530 instead of 0600, and if the launch were executed in an ordinary amount of time the attack would occur at the moment of the declaration. (As it turned out, incredible inefficiency at the Japanese Embassy in Washington delayed the declaration until well after 0830 Hawaiian time.)

The six carriers turned north into the wind, and the launch went smoothly, despite the heavy seas. By 0615 Hawaiian time all 183 aircraft of the first strike wave, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, a twenty-five year veteran of naval aviation, were on their way. From the six carriers came 49 high-level bombers, each carrying one 1,6000 pound armor piercing modified naval shell, 40 more planes carrying the specially designed shallow-running torpedoes, and 51 dive bombers armed with 500-pound bombs. Flying as a cover were 43 Zero’s.

The objectives of the combined air fleet were two fold, with all targets well-assigned. One group of dive-bombers would break into sections in order to neutralize the army, navy and marine airfields in the first five minutes; the remaining planes’ objective was the U. S. Fleet. If complete surprise at Pearl Harbor was achieved, Commander Fuchida would signal to that effect. Then the U.S. ships were to be destroyed as follows: first, the torpedo planes would attack, with battleships and carriers as primary targets, and then high-level and dive bombers would attack other targets of opportunity among the fleet. If complete surprise had not been achieved, Fuchida would give a different signal and the attack would proceed in reverse order: the Japanese would send their bombers in first, hoping that in the confusion of the attack, American gunners would be so preoccupied that the torpedo planes could slip in unnoticed, at water level. Hickam, Wheeler, Kaneohe, Ewa, Bellows , and Ford Island fields were dive-bombed at 0755. At 0800, Zero’s strafed these fields to destroy undamaged planes remaining on the ground or to shoot down any planes managing to get a loft.

The sight that met the eyes of those flyers ordered to make the direct attack on the American naval units in Pearl Harbor was awe-inspiring, despite the hours of drill at the mock-up tables and at Kagoshima Bay. Lying below them in the early morning sunlight, only partially obscured here and there by shreds of clouds from an earlier light rainfall, the Japanese saw some ninety ships of the U.S. fleet spread out before them. Seven battleships were moored close together in battleship row, and the Pennsylvania was in No. 1 drydock. Scattered at their various berths were the other ships of the fleet; two heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers, three seaplane tenders, five submarines, ten minesweepers, nine mine layers and various auxiliary craft. But the instant before the attack, the Japanese saw that that there indeed were no aircraft carriers present; although the flyers were disappointed, they did not yet know how fateful to the Japanese war effort this turn of events would be.

As so often happens in the excitement of battle, the agreed upon order of attack fell into shambles. The “complete surprise” signal of Fuchida was virtually ignored. At 0755, the torpedo planes and the high-level and dive bombers all went in together, neither group waiting for the other. Having achieved complete surprise, they met no initial anti-aircraft fire; it then built up only to a negligible response. For the first fifteen minutes, Pearl harbor was an arena of wave-skimming torpedo planes, plunging dive bombers, and high-level bombers, small specks in the sky–all discharging their lethal cargoes. At 0810, an enormous explosion in the Arizona sent a column of red-cored black smoke hurtling into the sky. One of eight hits by 1,600 pound bombs had penetrated he forward power magazine. She rose form the water, broke in half, and settled back–in an instant, she had become a total wreck. Other warships were sinking, capsizing or a fire. Similar success was achieved in attacks on the airfields, so that American air power was almost completely neutralized within a few minutes.

Slowly American counter-fire, at first wildly inaccurate, began to score. But the first wave of attack continued, with planes seeking new targets of opportunity or re-bombing ships that had already been crippled. At 0830, a lull developed, but Fuchida rallied his planes and the attack regained its intensity, until the planes ammunition started to give out and their gas began to run low. The first strike, although out of formation, then began to return to their carriers.

The carriers had already launched the second strike of 167 planes at 0715, with the same mixture of plane types and tactical assignments as before. This wave hit Pearl Harbor at 0915. It met a greater amount of hostile fire, and , while the attack was pressed home against fleet ships with the same intensity, it did little additional damage. Further attacks were made on Hickam Field, Ford Island, and Kaneohe air base, also with only minor results. By 1000, the second wave withdrew. The attack was over, although neither side yet realized it.

The damage was finally officially tabulated as follows: Battleships: Arizona, Blown up with a loss of over 1,000 lives—Oklahoma; capsized small part of hull above water— California; “sand gradually for three or four days”…”quarterdeck under twelve feet of water”—Nevada; beached opposite Hospital Point, wrecked condition—West Virginia; sunk at berth—Maryland; moderately damaged—Tennessee; seriously damaged to moderate — Pennsylvania; considerable damage in drydock—Utah; capsied at berth

Light Cruisers: Raleigh, Helena, Honolulu (moderately damaged)

Destroyers: Cassin and Downes ; (in drydock No. 1) severely damaged–Shaw; bow blown off (floating drydock)

Others: Repair ship Vestal alongside Arizona (beached)—seaplane tender Curtiss; badly damaged by crashing plane and 500 lb. bomb—minelayer Oglala; capsized…

American losses in military aircraft were also staggering, 188 planes destroyed 159 badly damaged only 43 still operational after attack. Military personnel losses were 2,403 killed, 1,178 wounded. Japanese losses were twenty-nine planes (15 dive-bombers & high-level bombers; 5 torpedo planes; 9 escort fighters)

SOURCE: Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-45); BY: Paul S. Dull

For the first half of 1941 the military strategy and preparations of the United States were aimed toward belligerent participation in the Atlantic war and maintenance in the Pacific of a defensive posture based on Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. Then, during July, Pacific strategy and preparations began a rapid shift that profoundly affected the outlook and thinking of American commanders both in Washington and in Hawaii. Through decoded intercepts, Washington knew early in the month that Japan had decided upon further aggression to the south. In the light of this knowledge, during the last week of July the United States decided to try to defend the Philippines in the event of war with Japan, and at the same time it applied stringent economic sanctions against Japan which were intended to deter the Japanese but which actually had the opposite effect. During August and September, the War Department developed an entirely new concept for defending the Philippines and checking a Japanese sweep southward. It now planned to station large numbers of Army heavy bombers (B-17’s) in the Philippines. This plan in turn required the quick preparation of intermediate supporting bases at Midway and Wake Islands along the direct air route from Hawaii to Manila and similar preparations as soon as possible along a secondary route to the southwest toward Australia.

Everyone recognized that these plans and preparations of late 1941 for projecting American military power toward and into the Far East could not become effective before early 1942, but no one either in Washington or in Hawaii gave much thought to calculating what should be done in case the Japanese chose to strike before then. In particular, the danger of a Japanese carrier-based air raid on Oahu, which had been recognized as very real in early 1941, all but ceased to be a matter of immediate concern; whereas, with the increasing likelihood of war with Japan, the danger of sabotage on Oahu loomed ever larger, not only in the thinking of the local Army and Navy commanders and their staffs, but also in Washington. As General Marshall put it, in testimony soon after the event, “I fully anticipated a terrific effort to cripple everything out there by sabotage“; and at the same time he acknowledged that to him the carrier attack had been an almost totally unexpected blow.

The Approach to War

The first warning to the Hawaiian Department that Japan had determined upon a new course of aggressive action went out from the War Department on 7 July 1941, though in milder language than the alerts flashed to Alaska and Panama four days earlier.  Later in the month, and six hours before the new economic sanctions against Japan became effective, General Short received his second warning, this time with advice that, while no immediate military retaliation by Japan was anticipated, the Hawaiian commander should take “appropriate precautionary measures.”  The general did so by ordering a full alert of his forces, in marked contrast to the lesser action taken by him four months later. His chief of staff explained to the local press that Army forces were “taking to the field for a ten-day maneuver period.” After several days the general called off the “maneuvers,” but he left Army guards on 24-hour watch at military and public utility installations, highway bridges, and along the Honolulu waterfront.

The first warning to Hawaii that Japan might soon resort to military action against the United States was sent by the Navy to its fleet commanders, including Admiral Kimmel, on 16 October. Because the Army staff in Washington disagreed with the Navy’s alarm, the War Department sent a supplementary message to the Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and to General Short, advising them that although “tension between United States and Japan remains strained . . . no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.” In short, the War Department did not think that Japan might be on the verge of attacking the United States. Under the circumstances General Short saw no need to do any more than what he was already doing. Vital installations had remained under guard against sabotage since July, and he “simply cautioned people who were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful.” No further official word about the prospects of war with Japan reached General Short directly from the War Department until 27 November, and it came then only after action by the Japanese and American Governments that made an early outbreak of war all but certain. Of course the general by reading the local newspapers could and presumably did learn unofficially a good deal about the tense negotiations with Japanese envoys in Washington, since the local press reported these negotiations very fully; and by 27 November this reporting included an accurate prediction of an impending rupture and of Japanese warlike moves in the offing.

On the eve of conflict the Honolulu press also reflected the opinion widely held in Washington that Japan was too weak to pose a really serious threat to the United States. As of 21 November the Secretary of the Interior, for one, was urging President Roosevelt to launch an immediate attack on Japan’s naval forces in their home waters, in order to destroy them and thus release American naval strength for full duty in the Atlantic at an early date. In September a War Department G-2 estimate of the Japanese Navy had paid it much higher respect; but of Japanese aircraft performance in China it rather condescendingly noted: “Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority.” A similar assumption lay behind General Arnold’s remark on 26 November that the Japanese had no seaborne aircraft that could catch one of the new Army B-24 heavy bombers, which with light loads could fly 290 miles per hour at 15,000 feet. He was wrong, as the Japanese Zeros that appeared over Pearl Harbor two weeks later were soon to prove. About 28 November G-2 estimated that Japan was then “completely extended militarily and economically” and thus was “momentarily unable to concentrate anywhere a military striking force sufficient to ensure victory”; and G-2 followed this estimate with a prediction on 5 December 1941 that for the next four months Germany would “remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives.”

If not reflecting informed opinion, the Honolulu Advertiser appears at least to have been in tune with it in stating in a lead editorial of 3 December 1941:..Unless there is an immediate and complete reversal of Tokyo policy, the die is cast. Japan and America will travel down the road to war. Such a course should be sad for Japan to contemplate. She is the most vulnerable nation in the world to attack and blockade. She is without natural resources. Four years of war have already left deep scars. She has a navy, but no air arm to support it….In fact Japan had ten aircraft carriers, to match the three then available in Pacific waters to the United States Navy and its associates.

As late as Friday, 21 November, President Roosevelt appears still to have been very doubtful about the intention of the Japanese to go to war, and reluctant to press matters with Japan. After lunching with the President, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes recorded Mr. Roosevelt’s remarks, “he wished he knew whether Japan was playing poker or not,” and “he was not sure whether or not Japan had a gun up its sleeve.” In fact, Japan had several guns, and the one that would soon go off with the biggest bang was the Japanese Navy’s Striking Force then completing its assembly in Tankan Bay in the southern Kurils, preparatory to a dash across the Pacific toward Hawaii.

By Monday afternoon, 24 November, the President and Secretary of State Hull had come to the conclusion that there was little remaining hope for a fruitful outcome of the negotiations. With Mr. Roosevelt’s approval Admiral Stark and General Marshall thereupon drafted a joint dispatch to the senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines, which went out as a Navy message not only to the Philippine but also to other Navy commanders, including Admiral Kimmel. The message warned of “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction” by Japanese forces, “including an attack on the Philippines or Guam;” and it requested its action addressees (among them, Admiral Kimmel) to inform the senior Army officer in their respective areas.

When the next and better known warnings of 27 November went out, the Army and Navy chiefs in Washington knew that war was all but certain, and probably imminent, although they had not been consulted about, nor even shown, the answer given to the Japanese envoys the preceding afternoon. Their concern and that of their staffs remained the Philippines; the War Department drafted its message of 27 November as a warning to General Douglas MacArthur, and phrased it to fit his peculiar circumstances. Unfortunately, only slightly modified versions that did not take local circumstances so carefully into account were sent to the other principal Army commanders in the Pacific area, in Panama, on the west coast, and in Hawaii. General Short’s version read: Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Whereas the directive of General MacArthur to undertake reconnaissance was a sensible one, since that was at least partially his responsibility, it was not applicable to General Short’s situation, for seaward reconnaissance to any meaningful distance was recognized in Hawaii as strictly the Navy’s business. Furthermore, the clear instruction for action to General MacArthur, “you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary,” was qualified in the other messages by the added phrase, “but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent.” But almost anything that General Short might do on Oahu was bound to be observed; as his predecessor, General Herron, subsequently remarked, “Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a goldfish bowl.” The first draft of the Hawaiian message had also included a specific warning about subversion; but after argument this warning went out as a separate and almost simultaneous G-2 message, in these terms: “Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.”

Within half an hour after receiving the first message, and before he saw the second, General Short (after consulting with his Chief of Staff only) sent his report of action taken: “Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.” The parallel Navy Department message of 27 November to Admiral Kimmel, more definite in its warning than the War Department’s, reached Hawaii some time later in the day. Subsequently, General Short remembered seeing it (or at least a paraphrase of it), although he could not remember that it had in any way influenced his own course of action, despite its clear opening phrases: “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan . . . have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.” Possibly the edge of these phrases was blunted for the Hawaiian commanders by the last sentence of the message, which implied that sabotage was now the worst that need be expected as far east as Guam and Samoa.

The next day, 28 November, the Hawaiian Department received two more messages from Washington, one addressed to General Short and the other through him to his air commander, both of them emphasizing the need for the most careful precautions against sabotage and other subversive activities. The general assumed these messages were follow-up replies to his terse report of the 27th. He answered the first of the new messages promptly and in detail, and this reply reached General Marshall’s office on 1 December. Since Washington made no comment on either of his reports, and gave him no further guidance about the impending crisis before the great blow fell, the general assumed also that the War Department approved his course of action.

General Short’s action had been to order an Alert No. 1, as defined in a new Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. This alert assumed increased danger of sabotage and internal unrest, but no threat from without. Under it the Army, in General Short’s words, “put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything,” and for the two infantry divisions this meant keeping thirty officers and 1,012 enlisted men on guard and patrol duty. The Hawaiian Air Force was ordered to concentrate planes so that they could be guarded more easily, and these orders were as easily executed since that was the usual practice at Hickam and Wheeler Fields anyway. The only deviation from procedures prescribed under Alert No. 1 was an order directing the operation of the new Army radar machines between four and seven each morning-the most likely period for a carrier strike, according to previous studies. On 28 November the local press explained, “The entire Hawaiian Department was ordered on a ‘routine training alert’ last night.”

Why General Short did not alert his command more fully was to become the subject of long questioning after the Japanese attacked. The new Standard Operating Procedure had prescribed two higher alerts: under No. 2, against a threat of air and surface bombardment, all coastal and air defenses, including antiaircraft guns, were to be ready for action; under No. 3, against a threat of invasion as well, all Army defenders were to occupy battle positions. When first questioned, General Short said he ordered Alert No. 1 for three reasons: first, he thought there was a “strong possibility” of sabotage, and he feared sabotage more than anything else; second, he had no information about any danger of external attack; and third, either No. 2 or No. 3 would interfere very seriously with training-“it was impossible to do any orderly training with them on.”

Before the warnings from Washington came in on 27 November, General Short had been in conference for three hours during the morning with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and members of their staffs, discussing a Washington plan for reinforcing Midway and Wake Islands by sending out fifty of the most modern Army pursuit planes then on Oahu. A proposal that the Hawaiian Department should part with half of its effective pursuit strength for even a limited period must itself have been an indication to General Short, as it was to Admiral Kimmel, that Washington had no inkling of any Japanese plan to attack Oahu. For local warning of such an attack the general was completely dependent on the Navy. During the conference on the 27th Admiral Kimmel turned to his War Plans officer, Captain Charles H. McMorris, and asked specifically what the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu were, and the answer was “none.” No one of the other Navy officials present challenged this judgment, and General Short saw no reason to question it. Both he and his naval colleagues were also heavily influenced by the knowledge that Japan could not attack Oahu with land-based planes, and by the continuing assumption that the Japanese would not risk a carrier strike as long as the bulk of the Pacific Fleet was in or west of Hawaiian waters.

The proposal to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake was only one of several measures planned or in preparation for sending Army reinforcements out of Oahu to the westward and southwestward, in anticipation of Japanese action. On 27 November General Short informed Admiral Bloch that the Army could not spare any 500-pound bombs with which to stock Midway and Wake; and even if that had been possible, the Army had no heavy bombers available to operate from them in an emergency-while the Hawaiian Department had six B-17’s in commission, all available and trained B-17 crews were engaged in ferrying heavy bombers to the Philippines. On 29 November the War Department notified the general that it had assumed responsibility for defending Christmas and Canton Islands on the new air ferry route to Australia and directed him to prepare small task forces for dispatch to these islands as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the flow of B-17’s from California through Hawaii to the Philippines continued; all of them came into Oahu unarmed, and it was General Short’s responsibility to- see to it that they were made combat-ready before flying westward.

All these factors helped to influence General Short’s decision to order and maintain a No. I alert only; and he must also have been influenced by knowledge that his air defense system was not ready to operate and that he could not spot many of the Army’s antiaircraft guns in their assigned field positions without provoking protests from powerful civilian interests on Oahu.

The Navy commanders had no more prescience than General Short in foreseeing what was about to happen. The Navy was already operating under procedures similar to those under the Army’s No. 1 alert; and the only new precaution ordered locally after the warning of the 27th was a careful surface patrol of Hawaiian waters against submarine attack. The Navy had about fifty long-range patrol planes with which it could have instituted distant reconnaissance from Oahu; but after careful reflection Admiral Kimmel decided his best course was “to bend every effort towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations” rather than “to expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches.” In consequence, when the attack came, the Navy had only three of its Oahu-based patrol planes in the air. And these were fleet planes, since none of the 108 aircraft specifically allotted by the Navy to Hawaii for distant reconnaissance was due to arrive for another year.

Between 27 November and 7 December 1941 neither the Army nor the Navy made an effort to invoke any of the plans for unity of command and joint operations so carefully drawn earlier in the year. Despite General Short’s personal conferences with Navy opposites on 27 November and on several other occasions during the succeeding ten days, an almost perfect insulation continued to exist between the local defense preparations of the two services (the conferences being about new defense measures to the westward). On this score, there can be no exception to what the majority of the Congressional Pearl Harbor Joint Committee had to say in 1946: “It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities.” Perhaps the most significant explanation of the almost complete absence of effective co-operation between the Army and Navy in local defense matters is the one pointed out by the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor investigating boards, that in Hawaii “no one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was exposed and consequently the Army and Navy commanders . . . were preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate alertness against attack.”

In any event Army and Navy business on Oahu proceeded almost as usual in the ten days before the Japanese attacked. Probably it was chance rather than design that brought all eight battleships of the Pacific Fleet into Pearl Harbor at one time on and after 2 December. At any rate they made a fine showing for the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinoff, who arrived from the Orient enroute to the United States on Thursday afternoon, 4 December-and became an unofficial overnight guest of the Governor and his naval aide.  The three most valuable properties of the Pacific Fleet, the aircraft carriers Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga, were all away. The battleship crews undoubtedly provided many of the 24,000 spectators who witnessed the annual Shrine-sponsored football game on Saturday afternoon, 6 December, from which the University of Hawaii emerged victorious over Willamette University by a score of 20 to 6.

Three days earlier, a plea for more field repair and maintenance equipment had been sent by the Hickman commander to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which opened: “Due to the unsettled world conditions, it is believed that there is a probability of there being a necessity in the near future of repairing and defending this and other airdromes of this Department.”  But the official Army outlook, as presented in a reconstructed G-2 estimate of the situation, was less alarming. This estimate noted that the Hawaiian Department had no knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther east than the China Sea and no information to indicate operations by Japanese aircraft except on the Asiatic mainland and in adjacent areas. Locally, there had been plenty of warnings about sabotage, but no action by a resident of the Territory of Hawaii had indicated that subversive acts would be committed. The conclusions were:

  1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports en route to the Philippines, or other similar acts.
  2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

In other words Hawaii, preparing for war, as, yet had no need itself to be ready for large-scale attack.

The Plan and Launching of the Attack

The Japanese Navy had a very different idea, although the surprise carrier attack on Oahu on the morning of 7 December 1941 did not become an integral part of Japanese war plans until almost the last moment. For several years before 1941, Japanese naval plans had contemplated a possible submarine attack on the United States Fleet in Hawaiian waters, but it was only in January of that year that a scheme was proposed for a surprise air attack on the fleet while berthed and anchored in Pearl Harbor. Japanese sources are unanimous in crediting authorship of the idea to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. Its feasibility may have been suggested by United States Fleet exercises of 1938, during which the carrier Saratoga demonstrated that such a surprise attack could be successfully launched. Yamamoto’s proposal, and its subsequent highly secret study, coincided with a rumor reported by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew from Tokyo on 27 January 1941 that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was being planned by the Japanese.

In May 1941 Admiral Yamamoto presented his idea to the Japanese Naval General Staff. Without rejecting it outright that body remained, at least until late August, generally opposed to including a risky carrier operation in Japanese plans for naval action in the event of war with the United States; and it was not until 20 October that the Naval General Staff formally approved the plan. In the meantime, it appears that during the spring and summer of 1941 the 1st Air Fleet under Yamamoto’s direction undertook some preliminary detailed planning and training for an attack such as the admiral had projected; and between 2 and 13 September his plan was war-gamed in Tokyo by Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff officers. In the midst of these table-top maneuvers, on 6 September, the Japanese Government made its decision to go to war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, unless it’s minimum demands for control of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were met by late October.

War-gaming convinced the Japanese Navy that the Pearl Harbor plan was feasible, although it might cost two carriers and one-third the attacking force of planes. Some serious technical difficulties remained to be overcome: one was the problem of a mid-Pacific mass refueling; another, not solved until early October, involved fixing wooden fins to naval torpedoes in order to stabilize them enough to be effective in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor; another required the last-minute conversion of a large number of 16-inch armor-piercing shells into 1,760-pound aerial bombs for the high altitude horizontal bombers to be employed. In late October the project was allotted top priority and maximum strength when the Japanese Army agreed to release aircraft from Manchuria for southern operations, and six carriers-including two new ones just commissioned-became available for the Hawaiian attack, instead of four as previously planned. On 5 November the Japanese Navy issued its detailed operational orders for action, on 7 November it tentatively announced 8 December (7 December in Hawaii) as “opening day,” and by 17 November the approved detailed plan for the Pearl Harbor attack had been delivered to the Striking Force. Sailing from a desolate harbor in the Kurils on 27 November, its ships moved silently and undetected across the North Pacific, but with orders to return if the United States and Japan reached agreement before the fatal day.

The Carrier Striking Task Force, or 1st Air Fleet, that was headed for Oahu, was a power-packed combination of 6 fast carriers supported and escorted by 2 fast battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 3 submarines. Aboard the carriers were more than 360 airplanes. Information passed through Tokyo kept the Striking Force supplied with precise last-minute information about the ships actually in Pearl Harbor, although the maps and some of the information available to the force were distinctly out of date. After reaching a point 500 miles due north of Oahu during the evening of 6 December (Hawaiian dating), the ships raced southward and prepared their planes for launching at a point about 200 miles from the island.

In the meantime another Japanese force of twenty-five submarines had deployed south of Oahu. These long-range and modern submarines belonged to the Advance Expeditionary Force of the 6th Fleet, and five of them carried two-man midget submarines “piggy-back,” for launching and penetration of Pearl Harbor to abet the air attack. And, if the Pacific Fleet got wind of the approaching carrier force and sortied, the 6th Fleet submarines were to attack en masse.

The Japanese planned to fly the first wave of planes from the carriers at 6:00 a.m. and begin their bombing two hours later, one-half hour after the United States had been formally notified by Japan that it would seek recourse to arms to attain its ends. Thus did Japan plan to avoid a charge of “attack without warning,” but the plan cut the time element too fine to allow for human error (in this case, slow decoding and typing of the Japanese message at the Washington Embassy) and the bombs were falling before Japanese diplomats arrived at the State Department to deliver the news of war. From intercepts American officials had already obtained a full translation of the Japanese message hours earlier, but they did not appreciate the full significance of its 1:00 p.m. deadline (7:30 a.m., Oahu time). Even General Marshall, who sent a last-minute warning about the deadline to Pacific commanders, went home to lunch instead of waiting in his office to find out what might be going to happen at that hour. And his warning did not reach General Short until hours after the event.

On Oahu the military forces did obtain other warnings of impending action. More than four hours before the air attack began, one of the midget submarines was sighted less than two miles outside the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy, and either this submarine or another like it was sunk near the harbor entrance at a quarter to seven. According to standing orders, the presence of any unidentified submarine in restricted waters was to be considered a warning of imminent attack on a larger scale; but the Navy was still in process of checking the authenticity of reports of these submarine actions when the big attack came. No one thought to tell the Army about them.

On Oahu’s north shore, three Army mobile SCR-270 radar sets were in operation this Sunday morning, from 4:00 to 7:00 a.m., in accordance with the schedule established under Alert No. I. All three (Kawailoa, Opana, and Kaaawa) recorded the approach of two Japanese reconnaissance planes, launched from cruisers, when they were about fifty miles away, beginning at 6:45 a.m. One of the stations (but not Opana) reported this flight to a Navy lieutenant on duty at the Army information center at Fort Shafter about 6:52 a.m., who reported it to another Navy lieutenant who responded that the Navy “had a reconnaissance flight out and that’s what this flight was.” Much better known is the report by the Opana station at 7:20 a.m. of a mass flight of planes approaching from a northerly direction. This was the first wave of Japanese bombers and fighters, which had been spotted by the Opana radar just after seven while still some 130 miles from Oahu. By the time the Opana report came in the information center had officially closed down, and an Army lieutenant who happened to be still on duty decided that nothing need be done about the call-he knew that American carriers were out and assumed that Opana had picked up a reconnaissance flight from one of them.

The Attack and the Response

An exact account of the Japanese air attack on the Pearl Harbor area and on Army airfields elsewhere on Oahu is impossible, partly because the commander of the first wave of planes gave a signal that was partially misinterpreted, so that the action did not proceed exactly according to a calculated plan. The first wave consisted of 49 high-level bombers, 51 dive bombers, 43 fighters, and 40 torpedo planes, a total of 183 planes. After approaching the north shore of Oahu about 7:40 a.m., some of the planes circled the island in order to swing in from the sea against south shore targets, while others flew over and between the mountain ranges to attack Wheeler Field and then other targets beyond. The attack began in the Pearl Harbor area at 7:55 a.m.-or five minutes early by the schedule so nicely timed in relation to the Japanese notification to Washington. All types of Japanese planes attacked more or less simultaneously. The torpedo planes did the greatest havoc to the battleships and other naval vessels afloat. Altogether, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 other naval vessels were destroyed or severely damaged, and most of this damage was done by the first wave. The greatest loss of life (almost half the total occurred early in the attack after one of the converted 16-inch shell bombs crashed into the battleship Arizona and exploded in a forward magazine, with awesome consequences. Within five minutes or so the Navy’s ships, whether hit or not, began putting up a tremendous antiaircraft barrage. The ships had 353 large-caliber and 427 short-range weapons aboard-or several times the Army’s antiaircraft strength on Oahu. Nonetheless, while many Japanese planes were riddled, only 9 were lost from the first wave as a result of American combat action.

The second wave of Japanese planes consisted of 54 high-level and 80 dive bombers and 36 fighters, making the total number of Japanese planes participating in the attack 353, plus the 2 reconnaissance planes that came in earlier. Launched one hour and fifteen minutes after the first wave, the planes of the second began to arrive on target shortly before 9:00 a.m. and continued the mass attack until about 9:45. The second wave, meeting stiffer antiaircraft resistance (mostly from Navy guns) and from a few Army fighter planes, lost 20 planes in action. The loss in combat of 29 planes represented 8 percent of those engaged, a proportion close to the average loss then being sustained by attacking forces in similar-sized air raids in Europe against alerted defenses. Some other Japanese planes were smashed up as they returned to their carriers, and of these at least 20 were a total loss. By about 1: 00 p.m. all returning Japanese planes were back on the carriers, and the Striking Force raced away to the northwest.

Although damage to the Pacific Fleet was the primary objective, the Japanese assigned 199 of the attacking planes, or nearly 60 percent of the total force, to missions against Army and Navy airfields on Oahu. The results for the Navy and the Marine Corps on this account were even more devastating than for the Army: at the Kaneohe Seaplane Base on the northeast shore, every one of the 33 patrol planes present was destroyed or damaged; nearly as great loss was sustained at the Ewa Marine Air Station west of Pearl Harbor, where not a single plane was left in condition to fly during or immediately after the attack; and the same fate overtook all of the patrol planes at the Ford Island Naval Air Station. In all, the Navy and Marine Corps had 87 planes destroyed and 31 damaged, and these figures included almost all of the fighters, bombers, and patrol planes on hand. In addition, during and after the attack the carrier Enterprise lost a number of planes flown into the battle area, at least five of which were shot down by naval antiaircraft fire.

At Hickam Field, where the Army had its usable bombers lined up in close formation in front of the hangars, the first Japanese planes flew over at 7:55 a.m. These were torpedo planes headed for Pearl Harbor, but they were followed almost immediately by four flights of dive bombers coming in from the south, southeast, and north almost simultaneously for bombing and strafing attacks on the supply depot, repair shops, and hangars. This opening attack lasted about ten minutes. A second one came at 8:25, this time from more low-flying dive bombers and one or more flights of high-altitude bombers. The third and final attack, by dive bombers and strafing fighters of the second wave, struck around 9:00 a.m. These strikes left the Hawaiian Air Depot completely destroyed, three of the five hangars burned, the barracks and other post installations badly damaged, and more than half the bombers present destroyed or damaged seriously. Casualties at Hickam were also heavy, particularly among men who had taken refuge in the hangars after the first attack. But the most vital facilities-the repair shops and machinery, and gasoline storage tanks-remained largely untouched.

In the midst of the Hickam action twelve unarmed B-17’s being ferried from the mainland arrived over Oahu. Eight of them managed to land at Hickam, and of the other four two came down at Haleiwa, one at Bellows, and one on a golf course near the northern tip of Oahu. Enemy action destroyed one of the planes and badly damaged three others.

A few minutes after the initial attack on Hickam, about twenty-five dive bombers hit at the hangars at Wheeler Field, and heavy casualties occurred when one bomb exploded in an adjoining barracks. After the bombing, the Japanese planes circled back at very low altitudes to machine-gun the pursuit craft parked (as at Hickam) in close formation in front of the hangars, and, as they circled, some of the enemy strafed nearby Schofield Barracks. After an extended lull another machine gun attack struck Wheeler, shortly after 9:00 a.m., and caught a number of pursuit ships being taxied to the runways for launching. Wheeler lost two hangars, and more than two-thirds of its planes were destroyed or badly damaged. The first attack effectively prevented any large-scale response by Wheeler’s fighter planes.

On the eve of Pearl Harbor the Army had two of its pursuit squadrons dispersed to Bellows and Haleiwa Fields for gunnery practice, and the planes of these squadrons were armed and needed only fuel and warming up to be ready for action. Apparently the Japanese did not plan to attack either of these outlying fields. A single fighter strafed Bellows about 8:30 a.m., and the flight of nine planes that attacked the same field about a half-hour later seems to have been attracted by the B-17 which landed there. Material damage at Bellows was slight, and was even less at Haleiwa Field, strafed by a single plane that followed in the two B-17’s which landed there. The second attack on Bellows caught the Army pursuits just as they were taking off. Two of them were shot down before they could gain altitude, and one pilot was killed as he climbed into his plane.

At all Army installations attacked by the Japanese, enemy dive bombers and fighters strafed individuals promiscuously, and in return Army men fired back with machine guns and lesser weapons. But the only effective action came from the planes at Haleiwa. Two young lieutenants at Wheeler were sufficiently alert after an all-night poker game to phone Haleiwa to have their planes fueled and warmed up and then to race over there and get off in P-40’s at or soon after 8:15 a.m. One of them is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. Another flight from Haleiwa had a less happy result when one of its planes, a P-36, was shot down by machine-gun fire from Schofield Barracks. Six P-36’s managed to get into the air from Wheeler Field during the attack, and four of them engaged the nine enemy planes which attacked Bellows Field. American pilots claimed two of the Japanese, and one of their own number was shot down.

Including the B-17’s arriving from the mainland, some 249 Army planes were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, and of these about 74 were destroyed and 71 seriously damaged. Among bombers the B-18’s, which were expendable, sustained the greatest loss; 14 of 24 B-17 heavies and 10 of 12 modern light A-20 bombers came through comparatively unscathed. The fighters took a heavier beating, but by 10 December the Army had 44 of them ready for action.

Most of the Army’s antiaircraft guns were unable to function during the attack. None of the mobile 3-inch batteries was at its assigned field position, and ammunition for all of them had to be fetched from the Ordnance Depot. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command alerted the units of the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft Artillery) at 8: 10 a.m., and within three or four minutes antiaircraft batteries at Fort Kamehameha (next to Hickam) and at Fort Weaver (on the other side of the Pearl Harbor entrance) opened fire with small arms. At 8:30 a fixed 3-inch battery at Weaver began to fire, and similar batteries at Kamehameha and on Sand Island in Honolulu harbor opened up against Japanese planes, the Sand Island battery claiming two of them. Other antiaircraft units at Camp Molekoli and Schofield Barracks fired small arms only at the enemy, the Schofield unit claiming one plane (in addition to the American one). But, with only a small fraction of the Army’s antiaircraft potential brought into play, its effort on this score was insignificant in comparison with the barrage thrown up by the guns of the Pacific Fleet.

Within minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs struck at Pearl Harbor, General Short issued orders that put the Hawaiian Department on a full war footing. By 8:45 a.m. his headquarters had begun to operate a forward command post located in tunnels at the Aliamanu Crater, three miles west of Fort Shafter. Between 8:20 and 9:00 a.m. the major ground commands-the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions-received word to deploy and take the actions required under a No. 3 Alert. Actually, all three had begun so to act before they got the formal word. The 24th Division had a battalion of infantry on the road from Schofield Barracks to its assigned battle position by 9:00 a.m., and thereafter other divisional units left Schofield as soon as they had drawn and loaded their ammunition and otherwise prepared for action. By late afternoon, all divisional elements were digging in at their assigned field positions, with all weapons except heavy howitzers at hand and ready to fire. As General Short put it, in the deployment “everything clicked,” one of his junior officers explaining: “We had gone so many times to our war positions that it just seemed like drill when they were firing at us.” The deployment showed clearly enough that the Hawaiian Department was thoroughly prepared to resist invasion, however unready it was against the peril of surprise air attack.

After the attack was over the Army defenders, still anticipating invasion, gave credence to a host of rumors and reports that enemy forces were still at hand. Throughout 7 December reports that parachute troops had landed poured in from all over Oahu, and sightings of hostile ships off shore were almost as numerous. With darkness the situation became even more tense, and General Short ordered all forces to be ready to resist another air attack or attempted landing at dawn. Throughout the night Army troops fired small weapons rather freely all over the island-with some ground patrols firing at each other. The following entries from the War Diary of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command for 8 December indicate the tension as the new dawn approached:

0428-All units notified to be on alert for landing attack at dawn.

0438-Flash. 30 Enemy planes approaching from Kauai.

0507-Enemy planes dive bombing Wheeler Field. (Some firing by batteries in Wheeler Field took place.)

0525-Schofield AA group reports barrage fire (searchlights useless because of low ceiling) against planes, later reported as friendly.

0608-53d Brigade reports small arms firing on friendly aircraft definitely established as from Marines or Navy.

By afternoon on 8 December a more normal outlook began to prevail. During the second night the firing tapered off, and orders similar to the following, issued by the commander of the 25th Division, helped to stop it: Promiscuous firing at friendly airplanes has been prevalent during preceding 36 hour period. Such firing will be stopped at once. Under no circumstances will any person in this division take up fire against any airplanes hostile or friendly until he or his unit has been definitely attacked by bombing or machine gun fire. The last stray planes of the enemy had in fact departed from their rendezvous point west of Oahu about 11:00 a.m. on the morning of 7 December, although enemy submarines were still around.

Except for some strafing, the Japanese confined their attack on 7 December to military installations. The “bombs” which fell on Honolulu and other civilian parts of the island were Navy 5-inch antiaircraft shells which had failed to detonate in the air. Explosions in Honolulu started three major fires, and at least 57 civilians were killed and nearly as many seriously injured.

Casualties among American service personnel were of course much higher. The Navy and Marine Corps have counted 2,117 killed or died of wounds, and 779 others wounded in action.  The far smaller Army casualties are difficult to determine with exactitude. General Short, in his report on the battle, listed 228 Army men dead or died of wounds, 110 seriously wounded, and 358 slightly wounded, a total of 696 Army battle casualties, as of midnight, 10 December. These appear to be about as accurate as any figures compiled and published since. The enemy acknowledged a loss of 55 men in planes; 9 of the 10 men aboard midget submarines were lost, the other one being America’s first prisoner of war in World War II; and on 10 December the Japanese also lost one of their large submarines (the I-70) and its crew.

When General Short submitted his report of the action to the War Department on 12 December, he had not yet heard of the drama being acted out on the isolated island of Niihau, west of Kauai. A crippled Japanese plane landed on Niihau on Sunday afternoon, about 2:00 p.m. After first being disarmed by a native Hawaiian, the Japanese pilot persuaded one of the two men of Japanese descent on the island-an American citizen-to free him, return his weapons, and join him on a rampage. The affair ended on Saturday morning, 13 December, and before help summoned from Kauai had arrived. Another Hawaiian, Benhakaka Kanahele, and his wife were captured by the two Japanese; but they jumped their captors and, after Kanahele was fully aroused by bullets in his stomach, groin, and leg, he picked up the Japanese pilot and smashed his head against a stone wall. The Nisei took one look, shot himself, and the “Battle of Niihau” was over.

Investigation and Judgment

News of the Japanese attack on Oahu reached Washington almost immediately. The Navy sent the first official word at 8:00 a.m., and Secretary Hull knew about the attack before he received the Japanese envoys with their fateful message. President Roosevelt and his principal advisers had expected war, but they were as surprised as the Hawaiian commanders when the war began in Hawaii. To find out what had happened, and why, the President sent Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on a flying trip to Hawaii, the Secretary arriving there on the morning of 11 December and departing the next afternoon. His report, delivered to Mr. Roosevelt on the morning of 15 December, touched off the first of the formal investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack. None of them developed the position of the Hawaiian commanders any better than Secretary Knox did in his report:

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

There was likewise plenty of evidence of what happened on 7 December to substantiate Mr. Knox’s conclusion that “once action was joined the courage, determination, and the resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired.

Despite the devastation wrought by the Japanese, service chiefs both in Washington and in Hawaii underestimated the weight of the Japanese attack. The consensus in the days immediately following the action was that Japan had used no more than three carriers and 180 planes. This under­estimate persisted during December and January through the investigation of the commission headed by justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, and it lent a good deal more color than justifiable to charges that the Hawaiian Department could have put up a much more effective defense if its forces had been properly alerted. Undoubtedly, if there had been plenty of warning, there could and would have been a more effective defense, but the Japanese struck with such overwhelming force that there would have been little difference in the damage done-except, of course, to Japanese planes and possibly to the carriers. Certainly the unheeded warnings of the last hour or so before the attack could have made little difference in the Army’s defense. It would have required (and actually did require) several hours’ effort to get most of the Army’s antiaircraft guns into position and ready to fire, and in any event the Army had very few guns that could have dealt with the low-flying torpedo planes and dive bombers. As for the Army’s pursuit ships, the well-known warning by the Opana radar might have provided enough time to disperse them to bunkers at Wheeler Field, but not enough to get them into the air against the first wave of Japanese planes. As Admiral King observed three years after the event, the basic reason the attack succeeded so well was the general blindness of the United States Army and Navy to Japanese potentialities in the central Pacific. The Roberts Commission and later investigations found much to criticize about the organization and operation of defense forces in Hawaii, but General Short and his Navy colleagues stoutly defended the “system.” Said General Short: “I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very serious mistake when we didn’t go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.”

Whether Washington gave the Hawaiian commanders enough information to make a correct estimate of the situation remains a much argued question. But on the central issue of responsibility, no one has improved on the judgment of Secretary of War Stimson, recorded in his diary the day that the report of the Roberts Commission was made public:

The printed report does not and could not go into what is the real underlying basis of the trouble, namely, that both services had not fully learned the lessons of the development of air power in respect to the defense of a navy and of a naval base. This failure and shortcoming pervaded the services and the nation. We had grown to rely on the impregnability of Pearl Harbor and nobody had anticipated that the Japs could make an attack by air as thoroughly as they did. Crete and Greece had taught us the vulnerability of a fleet in narrow seas against attacks by shore-based aircraft. It was the Japs who carried out this lesson of attacks upon a fleet from carriers in the high seas. I doubt if anybody in the Navy or the Army believed that they could successfully do it or would try it. Certainly nobody in the responsible positions. And it was only through such a disaster that we could all in the nation learn what modern air power can do even in the high seas.

SOURCE: Guarding the United States And Its Outposts; BY: Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Byron Fairchild (United States Army Center of Military History)

Pearl Harbor Planning (Jan.-Nov. 1941)

When Japanese planes struck immobile United States warships and aircraft at Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941, they were executing pinpointed plans conceived months in advance and cloaked in the utmost secrecy. Authoritative Japanese documents obtained since the termination of war and interrogations of the high naval personnel who participated in or had knowledge of this planning make it possible to reconstruct a complete and accurate picture of how the Pearl Harbor attack was conceived and developed over an eight-month period preceding the final outbreak of hostilities.

Prior to 1941 Japanese naval planning for a possible war with the United States had been based upon the assumption that the latter would be Japan’s only enemy and it envisaged awaiting attack by the American fleet in the Western Pacific where Japan’s numerically inferior fleet could operate at an advantage. By the end of 1940, however, Japan’s entry into the Tripartite Alliance and the United States’ aid commitments to Britain had created a new international line-up which made previous Japanese naval planning obsolete. The Japanese Navy began to plan for a simultaneous war against the United States and Britain.

The idea of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at the outset of war, with the object of gaining at least temporary naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, was first conceived in early January 1941 by Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Admiral Yamamoto at that time ordered Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the feasibility of such an attack.

On the basis of this preliminary study, Admiral Yamamoto in June 1941 began actively pressing for the adoption of his plan by the Navy General Staff as part of Japan’s naval strategy in the event of war. Crippling the United States fleet at Hawaii at the start of hostilities, he argued, was absolutely essential to place the Western Pacific under Japanese control for the period necessary to complete the occupation of the strategic areas and economic resources of the South. Were American fleet strength at Hawaii left intact, it could immediately make an incursion into the Western Pacific in the midst of the Southern operations, catching the Japanese fleet dispersed in different areas and unable to deploy for a decisive battle. Under these conditions, he warned, the United States would probably seize Japan’s island bases in the Marshals and transform them into advance bases of operation against Japan.

Despite Admiral Yamamoto’s arguments, his plan was vigorously opposed by a section of the Navy General Staff on the ground that swift occupation of the Southern areas was the prime necessity, and that this might fail if Japanese naval strength were divided between operations against Hawaii and support of the Southern invasions. It was further pointed out that detection of the Japanese force en route to Hawaii might result in its complete destruction, and that, even if this did not occur, the attack would be ineffectual if the bulk of the United States fleet was not caught in Pearl Harbor.

This disagreement in the Navy High Command had not been resolved by 10 September, when staff officers of all fleet units assembled at the Naval War College in Tokyo for the annual Navy war games. Just four days earlier the Imperial conference of 6 September had debated the issue of war or peace in a dramatic session and had decided that Japanese military preparations must be speedily brought to completion. The games therefore took place amidst an atmosphere of unusual tension, further heightened by the fact that the central problem of study assumed an American fleet attack into the Western Pacific as a result of Japanese invasion operations in the Southern area.

Admiral Yamamoto himself planned and exercised over-all supervision of the games. A general study session, including chart maneuvers participated in by all officers in tactical command of fleet units, occupied the first three days–10, 11, and 12 September. The last day, 13 September, was devoted to a special study session. Thirteen umpires headed by Rear Adm. Seiichi Ito, Vice-Chief of Navy General Staff, ruled on the execution of maneuvers. The Japanese (Blue) Forces were under command of Rear Admiral Matomi Ugaki, Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, and the British-American (Red) Forces under command of Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu, First Fleet Commander.

While the principal games were conducted on the old hypothesis of meeting an American fleet attack in the Western Pacific, a restricted group of staff officers of the Combined Fleet and commanders of those fleet units which eventually made up the Pearl Harbor Task Force met in a separate and top-secret session, the purpose of which was to study problems connected with a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. These problems included:

1. Feasibility of an attack if (as estimated) only 50 per cent of American Pacific Fleet strength were in harbor.

2. The possibility of detection by American search planes before the attack could be executed.

3. The refueling at sea of Task Force units with inadequate cruising range.

The conclusions reached with regard to the solution of these problems were those later embodied in the actual operational plan and carried out in the Task Force attack. However, it was not until 20 October, after Admiral Yamamoto had threatened to resign over the issue, that Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of Navy General Staff, approved the Pearl Harbor plan in principle over General Staff opposition. Preparation of the detailed attack plan was completed during October and finally sanctioned by Admiral Nagano on 3 November. In order to preserve secrecy, knowledge of the plan in its entirety was limited to the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, the Chief and members of the Operations Section, Navy General Staff, Commander-in­Chief, Chief of Staff, and most staff officers of the Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet and Sixth Fleet. Evidence indicates that Army leaders were not informed until sometime in November, following the issue of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1.

Even in this order, issued on 5 November, the missions of the Advance (Submarine) Force and the Task Force which were to participate in the Pearl Harbor attack were left blank in the printed text, and the missing portions were communicated verbally only to those listed in the preceding paragraph. The commanders of the Task Force units, which assembled in Tankan Bay between 15 and 22 November, were not informed of the attack plan until Vice Admiral Nagumo, commanding the Force, issued Task Force Top Secret Operations Order No. 1 on 23 November, three days before departure for Hawaiian waters. Crew members were told that Pearl Harbor was the target only after receipt of the Combined Fleet X-Day order on 2 December.

{CONTRIBUTOR NOTE: the date 8 December for the attack is due to the International Date line, it was this date in Tokyo}


World War Two: Marines Surrender; China -Guam December 1941

World War Two: Fall of Wake Island, 11-23 December 1941

World War Two: Philippines (Prewar, Part 1-2; 3-4-5); Building the USAFFE


World News Headlines: 12-07-2018

GERMANY (DW) Conservatives to pick Angela Merkel’s successor as CDU head; Riding high in opinion polls, Christian Democrats are meeting this weekend to choose Angela Merkel’s successor. Party leadership is often a springboard to the chancellorship, and whom to choose will be a tricky decision. The 1,001 delegates at the conference held by the Christian Democrats (CDU) in Hamburg on have been tasked with electing a new party chair and other internal leaders during a two-day conference starting Friday. De facto, they will also be seeking their front-runner to take over power, sooner or later, from Angela Merkel when her long tenure as the head of the German government ends. “I’m very grateful that I could be party chairwoman for 18 years — it is a very, very long time and the CDU of course had its ups and downs,” Merkel said as she arrived at the conference venue in Hamburg. “But we won four national elections together… and I am happy I can remain chancellor.” The question of who would succeed Merkel became urgent in late October when she announced that she would not seek to extend her 18 years as CDU party chairwoman this year or run again for re-election as chancellor when the current Bundestag expires in 2021.

(DW) France boosts security amid fear of new ‘yellow vest’ protest riots; Officials warned that “major violence” could hit Paris as “yellow vest” protesters plan to gather again this weekend. Teens have also blocked hundreds of schools, while several unions called for solidarity strikes. The political crisis engulfing French President Emmanuel Macron’s government showed no signs of abating on Thursday, as public anger continues to grow despite the scrapping of a controversial fuel tax hike. Authorities across France are bracing for another weekend of “yellow vest” protests. The movement’s members are known for wearing yellow safety vests carried by French motorists. The protests began as demonstrations against the fuel tax, which started in November but turned violent in Paris last Saturday, with some of the worst rioting in France in decades. Three weeks of protests have led to four deaths and left hundreds injured. Some 89,000 security personnel will be deployed across the country on Saturday ahead of the fourth weekend of planned rallies, French Prime Minister Edouard Philippe said on Thursday. About 8,000 officers will be in Paris where armored vehicles will be on the streets for the first time since 2005 when riots broke out in the capital’s suburbs. “We are facing people who are not here to protest, but to smash and we want to have the means to not give them a free rein,” Philippe said during an interview on TF1 national evening news.

(DW) Migrant rescue ship Aquarius to end operations; The NGOs that chartered the Aquarius cited a “smear campaign” by European governments as the reason for its ceasing operations. The ship has been stranded in Marseille since losing its registration.

(DW) Pressure on Germany as UK telecoms company shuns Huawei; German officials were reportedly pushing earlier this year for their government to follow other countries’ lead and slap a ban on Chinese IT firm Huawei. But Berlin doesn’t seem inclined to bow to US pressure. Chinese multinational tech giant Huawei Technologies opened a new information security lab in the German city of Bonn last month. Some observers see the move as designed to butter up German regulators ahead of the country’s 5G mobile spectrum auction. The German network regulator (BNetzA) is finalizing the terms for the 5G licensing round it plans to hold in the first quarter of 2019. The total cost of building Germany’s 5G networks could be €80 billion ($91 billion) and this means high stakes for Huawei and its rivals Ericsson, Nokia, ZTE and Samsung.

(DW) Ecuador: WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange can leave London embassy; Conditions have been met for Julian Assange to leave Ecuador’s embassy in London. Britain has guaranteed that the WikiLeaks founder would not be extradited to any country where his life would be in danger.

(DW) Nicolas Maduro and Vladimir Putin: United by oil, isolation; Venezuela’s economy is in a downward spiral, and the country owes Russia billions. Caracas may seem like an unequal partner for Moscow at first glance, but an increasingly isolated Russia is keeping its friends close. It seems that Putin is happy to continue to lend a helping hand to Venezuela. Maduro’s visit comes as the country’s economy is spiraling and it is increasing isolated on the world stage. The president has been condemned for ordering violent measures against the opposition and protesters. Putin acknowledged Maduro’s challenges: “We know and understand that the situation in Venezuela is still difficult.” And the Russian president praised his counterpart’s efforts to reach a “mutual understanding in society” and even warned that he condemns any attempt to “change the situation [in Venezuela] with force.” Putin is known to have a natural distrust for coups and popular uprisings.

(DW) Bolivians protest after Supreme Court allows President Evo Morales to run for fourth term; Thousands of angry Bolivians have taken to the streets across the country two days after the decision. The court’s ruling overturned a 2016 referendum spurred by Morales’ attempts to amend the constitution. Thousands of angry Bolivians took to the streets Thursday to protest a decision by the country’s Supreme Electoral Court allowing long-serving President Evo Morales to stand for a fourth term in office. Although Bolivia’s constitution bars him from running in next October’s election and a 2016 national referendum determined he should not be allowed to change the constitution to do so, the court, nevertheless, ruled in his favor on Tuesday.

(DW) France to tax tech giants from 2019 if EU fails to act; Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire said France would give the EU until March to come up with a deal on taxing US internet giants. If it fails, France will go ahead and impose its own taxes in 2019. France has said it will start taxing Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, the big US technology companies known as GAFA, if European Union finance ministers fail to agree on a bloc-wide digital tax next year. “I am giving myself until March to reach a deal on a European tax on the digital giants,” Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire told France 2 television on Thursday. “If the European states do not take their responsibilities on taxing the GAFA, we will do it at a national level in 2019,” he added. France, backed by Germany, had proposed a comprehensive digital services tax (DST) to cover all 28 EU member states. But Ireland vetoed the move, arguing that it would exacerbate US-EU trade tensions. Dublin also said the bloc should wait until the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had presented its tax proposals in 2019.

(DW) Cuban citizens can now access the Internet on smartphones; Cubans became eligible to sign up for data plans on their smartphones. It is a long-awaited, and expensive, development on an island that limited mobile access to the Internet for most people. People began receiving text messages in the morning from the state telephone monopoly informing them that they could buy internet access packages. Previously, nearly all Cubans could use their mobiles only to access their state-run email accounts unless they connected to the internet at a limited number of government-sponsored Wi-Fi spots.

(DW) Germany: Third of small and mid-sized companies have been hacked; A new study has found that a third of small and medium-sized companies have been the victim of industrial espionage. Experts say they should work more closely with authorities to prevent future attacks.

(DW) EU, France step up security, development aid for Africa’s G5 Sahel; The EU and France have increased their financial support for projects in the five Sahel states which sit on the southern rim of Africa’s Sahara desert. Terrorism and lawlessness have blighted the region for years. A two-day donor conference in the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott ended on Thursday with pledges from the European Union and France to increase their financial contributions to development and security projects in Africa’s volatile Sahal region:

(DW) Rwandan court acquits government critic Diane Rwigara; A Rwandan court has dismissed all charges against opposition figure Diane Rwigara. This shows an independence of the judiciary, says political scientist Phil Clark. In a surprise move, a Rwandan court dismissed all charges against Diane Rwigara and her 59-year-old mother Adeline. They had faced charges of fraud and incitement to insurrection over criticism of the government. In 2017, Rwigara attempted to run for the presidency against President Kagame but was barred from doing so on the grounds of allegedly having forged supporter signatures. The two spent a year in jail before being released on bail in October 2018. Rights groups Human Rights Watch had previously criticized the Rwandan government, saying that the crackdown showed its unwillingness “to tolerate criticism or accept a role for opposition parties.” US lawmakers also weighed in on the international debate surrounding the case, voicing their support for Rwigara. Phil Clark, a political scientist at SOAS in London, spoke to DW about the case.

FRANCE (France24) Eiffel Tower, museums to close during new ‘Yellow Vest’ protests; Around a dozen museums across the capital have also said they will remain closed on Saturday after vandalism and clashes between protesters and police last week rocked France. The announcements came as around 200 high schools across the country remained blocked or disrupted by students protesting a raft of education overhauls, on a fourth day of action called to coincide with the anti-government demonstrations. An interior ministry official told AFP earlier that authorities were bracing for “significant violence” on Saturday, based on indications that protesters on both the far right and far left are planning to converge on the capital.

(France24) China relaxes smog restrictions as economy slows; Blue skies in Beijing are rare these days. Smog has returned to the Chinese capital, despite a concerted government crackdown that had seen air quality improve earlier this year. As China faces a slowing economy, experts say the environment is taking a backseat to economic growth. Our correspondents report.

(France24) South Sudan: NGO files landmark suit against government for sexual violence; in South Sudan where over the past two weeks, more than 125 women and girls have sought medical treatment for assaults in the Upper Nile region. They say some of the perpetrators wore military uniforms. After 52 years in the making, Senegal has opened it’s Museum of Black Civilizations. And Seyi Shay is in Paris to promote her new single “Gimme Love”

(France24) Canada’s Trudeau insists arrest of Huawei CFO not ‘political’; With China demanding the release of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said officers who arrested her Saturday as she was changing planes in Vancouver had acted on their own. “I can assure everyone that we are a country (with) an independent judiciary,” Trudeau told a tech conference in Montreal. “And they took this decision without any political involvement or interference.” Citing a court-ordered publication ban sought by Meng, Trudeau declined to comment further on the case, which according to a US senator was brought over Huawei’s activities in Iran.

JAPAN (NHK) Final showdown over foreign workers; Japan’s ruling coalition is pushing to get a controversial bill passed before the end of the day. It would pave the way for hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to enter the country amid a severe labor shortage. The immigration law revision has been a key issue during this Diet session. It would expand work permits for a wide range of blue-collar and healthcare jobs. But there are still a lot of questions about how exactly the bill would work. Japan’s prime minister has promised to make that clearer before next April when it is set to come into effect. The opposition says the government should tackle problems with existing programs before passing the bill. It’s determined to put up as much resistance as possible to block the legislation in the Upper House. The opposition camp tried to put forward a motion to dismiss a committee chair, but the governing coalition has a majority and voted down the motion. The current Diet session is set to close on Monday.

(NHK) Bolton knew about Huawei arrest in advance; US National Security Advisor John Bolton says he knew in advance about the arrest of a top executive from Chinese telecom device maker Huawei Technologies. Canadian authorities arrested Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver on December 1st at the request of the United States. Local media outlets are reporting that she is suspected of violating US sanctions against Iran. Bolton said on Thursday that the US has been concerned for years about the practice of Chinese firms to use stolen American intellectual property to engage in forced technology transfers. He spoke in an interview with National Public Radio. He said Huawei is one company the US has been concerned about. But he said this was not respecting Meng’s arrest. Bolton also said he doesn’t know whether President Donald Trump knew in advance about the arrest. But Bolton admitted having prior knowledge based on information provided by the Justice Department. Bolton did not say whether he knew during the US-China summit in Argentina on December 1st that the arrest would take place.

(NHK) Trudeau denies govt. role in Huawei arrest; Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau says his government was not involved in the arrest of a top executive of Chinese IT giant Huawei Technologies. Officials at Canada’s Justice Department said earlier they arrested Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver on December 1st at the request of the United States. Trudeau said on Thursday that Canada’s judiciary is independent and the appropriate authorities took the decision without any political involvement. He said his government was given a few days’ notice. Trudeau denied having contact with leaders of the countries concerned, such as Chinese President Xi Jinping, over the matter. Meng is expected to appear at a court hearing on Friday to hear a decision on her continued detention. A separate hearing will reportedly consider her extradition to the US. The charges against Meng have not been disclosed. Reuters says US authorities suspect Huawei used a British financial institution to make illegal transactions involving Iran and that they have been conducting an investigation since 2016.

(NHK) Govt. plans revising telecom equipment rules; The Japanese government plans to revise the rules for its procurement of telecommunications equipment to take into consideration the risks related to national security. The only current rules are on the cost of procurement. The government will begin studying revisions of the internal rules of the relevant ministries and agencies as early as next week, with an eye toward preventing information leaks from cyber-attacks. The US administration of President Donald Trump has banned the government from using products made by Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies due to national security concerns. The US has also asked countries that host US military bases not to use Chinese telecommunications equipment. The Japanese government plans to avoid naming specific Chinese companies in the revised rules. The minister in charge of cyber security, Yoshitaka Sakurada, says the government will take various steps by studying cyber security technologies and measures taken by other countries.

(NHK) Japan reconsidering Turkey nuclear project; The Japanese government and a consortium of private firms are reconsidering involvement in a nuclear power plant project in Turkey. They say the cost of the planned venture has skyrocketed. The government has been supporting the consortium consisting of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and other private Japanese firms. The export of infrastructure is a pillar of the Abe administration’s growth strategy. After conducting research into the project, the consortium decided that the cost of building a nuclear power plant on the Black Sea coast would be over 35 billion dollars, more than double the initial estimate. The increase is due to higher safety requirements implemented after the 2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The Japanese side had asked Turkey to increase the purchasing price of power generated at the nuclear plant. But Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan were unable to reach consensus in talks in Argentina earlier this month. Japan’s trade and industry minister Hiroshige Seko is expected to discuss the matter with Turkish government officials as early as January.

(NHK) Media: Russia sets up radar sites on islands; Russian media report that the country’s military has set up radar sites on several islands, including 4 Russian-held islands claimed by Japan. Interfax news agency reported this on Thursday based on sources, but did not give details on the islands involved. Russia deployed its latest anti-ship missile systems on 2 of the 4 Russian-held islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri, in 2016. Interfax reported that the new radar sites will help to increase the potential to monitor other countries’ military activities. On Wednesday, the US Pacific Fleet said the guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell conducted an operation in the vicinity of Peter the Great Bay, near Vladivostok. The purpose was “to challenge Russia’s excessive maritime claims” in the Sea of Japan. Russia is apparently making clear its intention to boost its defense capability in the area by setting up new radar sites. The islands are mentioned in the 1956 joint declaration governing a peace treaty between Japan and the then-Soviet Union. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin have agreed to accelerate negotiations on a peace treaty based on that declaration.

(NHK) UN seeking access to Uighur camps in China; The United Nations human rights chief is seeking access to China’s Xinjiang province, where Uighur Muslims are believed to be held in camps. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet told reporters on Wednesday that her office is receiving worrying reports about the human rights situation in Xinjiang. Bachelet said her office is asking for direct access to the region to verify the reports. International human rights groups say many Uighur Muslims in the autonomous region have been unfairly detained in the name of counterterrorism and forced to go through “reeducation” under terrible conditions. Experts say as many as one million Uighurs have been held in camps. China’s government says the camps only provide vocational training for Uighurs who have been influenced by extremism, so that they can return to society.

(NHK) Indonesian rebels claim soldiers killed; Indonesian military has retrieved the bodies of 16 people killed in an armed attack in the eastern province of Papua. The authorities are reportedly saying that separatist rebels killed dozens of construction workers, but the rebel group insists they killed Indonesian soldiers. Local media say the West Papua Liberation Army has claimed responsibility for the attack. The group’s spokesperson said it is sure that those killed were soldiers of an Indonesian army unit specializing in battle infrastructure engineering. He added that, after 3 months’ observation, they can distinguish workers from soldiers. He argues that people in Papua do not want the trans-Papua highway currently under construction. Police say the armed group stormed a bridge construction site in Papua on Sunday. They say the group sees Indonesia as a colonial occupier and is seeking the region’s independence.

(NHK) South Korea mulls arrests of former top judges; A court in South Korea is deciding whether two former Supreme Court justices should be arrested for abuse of power. It is the country’s first such situation. The two retired Justices were summoned to the Seoul Central District Court on Thursday morning. Both are facing a slew of possible charges including abuse of power and dereliction of duty. Prosecutors allege they pressured other judges to make rulings that favored former President Park Geun-hye, who is currently serving a prison term for corruption. Prosecutors say Park Byong-dae deliberately put off a wartime labor case filed by former Korean workers who say they were forced to work in Japanese factories. It’s believed he did so after a request from the South Korean foreign ministry. At the time the ministry was trying to mend ties with Japan. Former justice Ko Young-han is accused of covering up an appellate court judge’s leaking of secret information because the judge had close ties with an important staff member in the presidential office. Prosecutors also suspect the two justices were involved in improper lobbying of the presidential office on behalf of the Supreme Court Chief Justice at the time. The court is expected to give its decision by Friday morning at the latest.